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CASE NOTES

From the very nature of this doctrine of subrogation, its mantle must many
times, like the garment 21of charity, cover and wipe out a number of sins of
omission or commission.
The courts have been prone to interpret the provisions of the Code
liberally rather than strictly.22 The Code, ii: has been held, is designed to
simplify rather than complicate commercial transactions.28 Subrogation
has long been considered a doctrine that readily lends itself to liberal,
24
equitable, and broad application.
In the case at bar, the court in its raticnale did not specifically rule
that the doctrine of subrogation supersedes section 9-312 (5) (a). In effect,
it ruled that it was merely stressing the in:ention of the drafters of the
Code that the concept of subrogation was, and should be, an inherent part
of the Code. This rationale is not inconsisl:ent with the modern, liberal
approach to law, which, is increasingly striking down narrow, technical
defeat rather than aid the
interpretations of statutes which too often 25
realistic and orderly administration of justice.

Robert Bromberg
21
22
23
24

Iowa County Bank v. Pittz, 192 Wis. 83, 91, 211 N.W. 134, 137 (1927).
See Note, 13 DE PAUL L. REv. 172 (1963).
Arcuri v. Weiss, 198 Pa. Super. 506, 184 A.2d 24 (1962).
Jackson Co. v. Bolyston Mutual Insurance Co.. 139 Mass. 508, 2 N.E. 103 (1885).

25 Contra, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. State Public School Building Authority, 76 Dauphin County (Pa.) Bar Ass'n, Reporter, 296 (1962). This was a trial
court case which was not appealed. The court ruled that since the surety (party seeking subrogation) had constructive notice of bank's duly filed security interest, it
should not be subrogated to the rights of that bank.

COMMERCIAL LAW-WARANTIES-PRIVITY AND
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Plaintiff was employed as the manager of a hotel. In the course of his
duties as manager he personally purchased four bottles of champagne for
the hotel. The wine was produced and bottlcd by defendant. While plaintiff and other employees were preparing to serve the wine, a cap from one
of the bottles suddenly ejected, flew through the air, and struck the
plaintiff in the eye, causing serious injury. An action was brought based
on breach of implied warranty. The trial court dismissed the complaint
upon demurrer by the defendant. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
reversed the lower court's decision. Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Company,
414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463 (1964).
Two problems were faced by the court in its decision in favor of the
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plaintiff. The first involved an interpretation of the Uniform Commercial
Code (Title 12A of the Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated) and its effect
upon the relationship between the parties to the suit. The Uniform Commercial Code provides for liability for breach of implied warranty' and
further extends warranty protection to those not classically within privity.2 These two sections, however, did not place the plaintiff in the necessary relationship unless he could have been considered the "buyer" of
the wine. The court accordingly examined the plaintiff's position with
reference to section 2-1033 and found that the plaintiff "was cast in the
important role of 'buyer' and consummated the 'contract to buy' for his
employer .... -4Since the court found that the plaintiff was, in fact, the
buyer of the wine, the Code provisions regarding implied warranty were
satisfied and plaintiff was entitled to a recovery for the breach.
The second problem faced by the court was the case of Hochgertel v.
Canada Dry Corp.,5 a very recent decision by the same court with a
disturbingly similar fact situation. Plaintiff in this case was employed as
a bartender and was injured when a bottle of club soda, near which he
was working, exploded, sending fragments of glass flying through the air.
The club soda had been purchased by the plaintiff's employer. The court
held that the seller's implied warranty to the buyer did not extend to the
plaintiff as an employee. The court in Yentzer easily distinguished Hochgertel on the ground that the plaintiff in the former case was a "buyer"
within the definition of section 2-103, whereas no such relationship existed
in the latter.
Justice Eagen, in his dissenting opinion in Yentzer, took exception to
the majority interpretation of section 2-103 by way of a reference to yet
another section of the Code, section 1-201 (32) and (33), which defines
1

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-314, 12A PENN. STAT. ANN. § 2-314 (1954). "(1)
Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to
goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink to be
consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale. (2) Goods to be merchantable
must be at least such as (c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
and used. . . . "Hereinafter all references to the Uniform Commerical Code are
to the corresponding sections in Title 12A of Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated
(1954) (with annual pocket part).
2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318. "A seller's warranty whether express or implied

extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who
is a guest in his home if itis reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume
or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.
A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section."
a UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 2-103 (1) (a). "In this Article unless the context other-

wise requires 'buyer' means a person who buys or contracts to buy goods."
4 Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Company, Inc., 414 Pa. 272,
, 199 A.2d 463, 464 (1964).
- 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
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"purchase" 6 and "purchaser.
Eagen's opinion because:

'7

Plaintiff is clearly not a purchaser in Justice

The plaintiff did not become vested with any interest in the wine merely because he served in the capacity of messenger fcr the purpose of picking it up at
the liquor store for his employer. s
This point made, the dissenting opinion argued that the plaintiff was
merely the agent of his employer and not in contractual privity with the
defendant. The conclusion of the dissent was that the plaintiff had an
adequate remedy in trespass, as stated in Loch v. Confair.9
The dissent raises an interesting question. It relied upon two definitions
found in the Code, those of "purchase" and "purchaser," to establish a link
between its agency argument and the Code position taken by the majority
opinion. Both terms, however, are foreign to the sections of the Code (sections 2-314, 2-315 and 2-318) which came under the scrutiny of the court.
The agency argument was sound in and of itself, and was in no need of
Code support, even of a definitional nature. :[f plaintiff was the agent of the
hotel, he was not the "buyer."
Ever since the oft-cited cases of Thomas v. Winchester1 ° and MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.," jurisdictions across the nation have tended to
become more and more liberal in their ap]:roach to the privity requirement. In a recent article in the NACCA Law Journal12 the statement is
made that: "The Buick doctrine has been embraced in all of the American
jurisdictions, although in Mississippi only federal court decisions have expressly accepted it. ' la Many cases, from a multitude of far-flung jurisdictions, are cited in support of this statement.'1 '
6 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201 (32). "Subject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent Articles of this Act which are applicable to specific Articles
or parts thereof, and unless the context otherwise requires, in this Act:
(32) 'Purchase' includes taking by sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien,
issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property."
7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5 1-201 (33): (The same introductory language as found
in note 6, supra, precedes sub-section (33).) "'Purchaser' means a person who takes
by purchase."
8 414 Pa. at .....
199 A.2d at 465.

9 361 Pa. 158, 93 A.2d 451 (1953). Plaintiffs picked up a bottle of Yukon Club
Sparkling Ginger Ale while shopping in a supermarket and were injured when it exploded. An action was brought for breach of implied warranty. The court held that
plaintiffs had no cause of action in warranty, but rather in trespass.
106 N.Y. 397 (1852).

11217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
1230 NACCA L.J. 362, 368 (1964).
ia See Gray v. Hayes-Sammons Chemical Co., 310 F.2d 291 (C.A. 5, 1962).
14

See also

HURSH, AMERICAN LAW

OF

PRODUCTS LIABILITY,

S16

(1961).
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Initially, the privity requirement was dropped only in cases involving
the "exceptions," such as food products, 15 products imminently dangerous
when defective, 16 products designed for intimate bodily use, 17 and so on.
Today the list of exceptions is greatly enlarged, and the theory has been
advanced that even section 2-318 of the Code is simply another excep18

tion.

What with privity seeing lean times, and the numerous recoveries being
granted for so-called exceptions, it is no wonder that the distinction between breach of warranty and negligence is disappearing. Implied warranty cases are now taking on the appearance of tort actions. The language
of Breitenstein, J., in Burgess v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,'9 affords ample
evidence of this view:
But in view of the modern trend against reliance on the privity rule [citing
cases] especially as to inherently dangerous chattels [citing cases] we cannot
base our decision on lack of privity in a case such as this where the nebulous
distinction between implied warranty and negligence amounts to no more than
a play on words because the breach of warranty, if any, is the result of negli20
gence.
The Code states must, of necessity, view privity differently than their
non-Code sister states. Section 2-318 is in the spirit of the privity require-

ment even though mention of privity is not made in so many words.2 '
How will these states reconcile the Code with the national trend? Not

everyone can be fitted into the category of buyer.
There would seem to be three alternatives available to the Code states:
1) They might strictly construe the language of the Code and thereby
maintain the traditional distinctions between ex contractu and ex delicto

actions, thereby forcing those lacking privity to rely upon a tort remedy;
15 Wiedeman v. Keller,

171 Ill. 93, 49 N.E. 210 (1897).
16 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
17 Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961).
18 12 DE PAUL L. REV. 178 (1962).
19 264 F.2d 495 (C.A. 10, 1959).
20 Id. at 497. See also Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y. 2d 432, 436,
191 N.E.2d 81, 82 (1963): "A breach of warranty, it is now clear, is not only a violation
of the sales contract out of which the warranty arises but is a tortious wrong suable by a
non-contracting party whose use of the warranted article is within the reasonable
contemplation of the vendor or manufacturer."
21 Comment 3 to section 2-318 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE indicates that the
section is meant to include as beneficiaries within its provisions the family, household,

and guests of the purchaser. The comment then states: "Beyond this, the section is
neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether
the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the
distributive chain." This would seem to indicate that the section is intended to be
flexible so as to adapt to the developing case law. This hardly is possible in light of

the language of the section. Perhaps the authors envisioned a slightly different developing case law.
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2) they might construe the language of the Code to fit as many cases as
possible into the "excepted" classification of section 2-318, by loosely interpreting "buyer," thereby achieving simply a more confused version of

the first alternative; or 3) they might work to revise the Code to bring
it into line with the national trend. Pennsylvania, it would appear, has
taken the second of these alternatives.
Quintin Sanhamel

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF PRESS-MISSTATEMENT OF FACT HELD PRIVILEGED IN LIBEL
ACTION BY PUBLIC OFFICIAL
The petitioner, "New York Times," published a paid political advertisement attacking segregationist activity in the South and requesting contributions to fight segregation. It is uncontroverted that some of the statements contained in the advertisement were false. No one was specifically
mentioned, but the respondent, police commissioner, charged libel by innuendo and sued the "New York Times." The trial judge instructed the
jury that the statements made were libelous per se. 1 The question of
whether the innuendos were strong enough to implicate the police commissioner in the minds of the reading public was left to the jury. A verdict
of $500,000 was returned against the defendants. The Supreme Court of
Alabama affirmed the judgment. 2 The United States Supreme Court held
that the first and fourteenth amendments require that a public official, in
order to recover for a defamatory falsehood, must prove that the statement
was made with actual malice. There being no evidence of actual malice
present in the case, the Supreme Court reversed. The two concurring
opinions3 argued in favor of an absolute privilege of free press, and thus
would extend the protection of the press even beyond that which the majority opinion had conditioned on the lack of actual malice. New York
Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Prior to this case, the guarantee of the first amendment had never immunized the press from subsequent liability for false and damaging statements. 4 Previously, the extent of the liability of the press depended upon
1

ALA. CODE tit. 7, §§ 908 & 914 (1940). Libel per se signifies either that the words
are defamatory on their face or that they are actionable without proof of damage.
PROSSER, TORTS § 93, p. 588 (2d ed. 1955).
2

New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 565, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).

3 Black, J., joined by Douglas, J. and Goldberg, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurred

in the result in separate opinions.
4The right of the press to invoke privilege where the publication in question contains
a misstatement of fact has been a controversial subject, the decisions of the various

